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EXTREMELY BROAD LAWS
Kiel Brennan-Marquez*

Extremely broad laws offend due process. Although the problem has not been lost
on courts, their solution to date has been haphazard:casting breadth as a species
of uncertainty ambiguity or vagueness and repurposing uncertainty-focused
doctrine accordingly. The trouble is, breadth and uncertaintyare not the same. They
have different analytic features and raise distinct concerns, making the tools
designed to resolve uncertainty ill-suited to reining in breadth. Vague and
ambiguous laws deprive people of notice about what the law requires. They evoke
the Star Chamber and Kafka stories the dread of inhabiting an incomprehensible
legal order. With broad laws, the issue is not notice but reach. Broad statutes can
be plenty clear about what they require. The problem is they sweep in too much
everyday conduct, arousingworry about outsized power and arbitraryenforcement.
Here, the literary specter is not Kajka, but Orwell, and the nightmare is not an
opaque legal system; it is a police state. Extremely broad laws, in this sense, are
problematic for the same basic reason as general warrants: they afford state
officials practically boundless justification to interfere with private life. After
expounding the problem abstractly,I close by exploring how courts might tackle the
breadth problem in practice and I ultimately suggest that judges should be
empowered to hold statutes "void-for-breadth."
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INTRODUCTION
Law must announce its demands. If ordinary people do not understand what
is required of them-if consulting statute books and case reporters would not inform
a reasonable person of her legal duties-the rule of law falters. And constitutionally,
due-process limits on legislative and executive power come into effect.'
That much is axiomatic. More controversial are laws that clearly announce
their demands yet seem to demand too much-sweeping so broadly that ordinary
people, despite being able to understand their duties, cannot hope to conform their
behavior or predict law's operation in practice. How do rule of law principles bear
on statutes that, as Justice Kagan recently put it, are "very broad [but] also very
clear"?2 Can a law subvert due process simply by reaching too much conduct, by
implicating too large a swath of everyday life?
Yes, I will argue-and courts appear to agree. The trouble is that
constitutional doctrine offers few tools, at present, for curtailing statutory breadth
head on.' So judges have adopted a second-best solution: recharacterizing breadth
1.
See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (explaining that due
process is denied when "ordinary people [do not] understand what conduct is prohibited...
."); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (stating that the Due Process
Clause forbids "unascertainable standards" that leave " [people] of common intelligence [to]
guess at [the law's] meaning .. ").
2.
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1098 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
3.
A notable exception is the "overbreadth" rule in First Amendment law, which
allows "a litigant... to bring a facial challenge to a statute despite the fact that the application
of the statute to the litigant under the facts of the case does not violate the Constitution," by
"argu[ing] that the entire statute should be struck down because the statute could be applied
unconstitutionally in certain hypothetical fact patterns." Luke Meier, A Broad Attack on
Overbreadth, 40 VAL. U. L. REv. 113, 113 (2005). On reflection, however, the overbreadth
rule is not about breadth per se; it does not support the proposition-as I explore here-that
a statute can be unconstitutional because of its breadth. See Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S.
576, 581 (1989) (explaining that overbreadth is "predicated on the danger that an overly broad
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as a species of linguistic uncertainty-vagueness or ambiguity-and repurposing
tools designed for those problems, the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the rule of
lenity, to constrain the reach of broad laws.
Functionally, the results have been acceptable, if sometimes unsatisfying.
But conceptually, the results verge on incoherent because breadth simply is not
uncertainty. Both problems relate to due process, but they differ fundamentally and
call for distinct forms of relief. Uncertainty is about notice. The key principle is that
people cannot be expected to abide by impenetrable demands. The fictional
touchstone is Kafka, and the historical analogue, the Star Chamber.
Breadth, on the other hand, is about governmental overreach. Extremely
broad laws can be (and often are) plenty clear about what they demand. The problem
is they demand too much; their demands are oppressive. Here, the dystopian
resonance is not to Kafka, but to Orwell. And the paradigm case, historically
speaking, is not the Star Chamber, but general warrants-those scraps of parchment
that, foreshadowing twentieth-century police states, conferred virtually limitless
power to agents of the Crown.
With these historical and literary parallels in view, this Essay aims to trace
the analytic distinction between breadth and uncertainty, and to explore the
normative worry each calls forth. Having done so, I conclude with some thoughts
about how courts can identify, and in practice push back against, constitutionally
troubling forms of statutory breadth. Ultimately, I argue that judges should be
empowered to hold statutes "void-for-breadth" as a means of both reining in
enforcement and disciplining the legislative process.
Before jumping into the analysis, it will be useful to describe a few casesto get a flavor both for what I mean by "extreme breadth," and how courts
(mistakenly) conflate breadth with uncertainty.

I. SOME RECENT EXAMPLES
Cases involving the conflation of breadth and uncertainty follow a simple
pattern. First, the court observes that, naturally construed, Statute X reaches FactPattern Y-an individual instance of conduct, or a category of conduct, which many
people would find too minor, or too out of sync with the apparent regulatory
purpose, to be sensibly regulated by Statute X. Second, the court deems Statute X
some combination of "ambiguous" or "vague" because it reaches Fact-Pattern Y.
Third, the court either: (1) imposes an out-of-thin-air limiting principle on Statute
X, designed to cordon off Fact-Pattern Y from its scope; or (2) declares Statute X
unconstitutionally vague in light of its application to Fact-Pattern Y.
Besides this three-step shuffle, breadth cases typically share another
commonality as well: dissenting opinions that highlight the problem. In other words,
statute, if left in place, may cause persons whose expression is constitutionallyprotected to

refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions .. ")(emphasis added).
Rather, the overbreadth rule is, in effect, a relaxed jurisdictional doctrine-one that permits
courts to ask whether a statute is consistent with the First Amendment in the abstract, without
having to wait for a plausibly unconstitutional application to arise.
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and not surprisingly, the conflation of breadth and uncertainty is a controversial
practice. It often inspires judges outside the majority to cry foul-censuring their
colleagues for refusing to acknowledge that dismay about the law's sweep, not
uncertainty about its content, is the actual source of consternation. 4 Behold a few
recent examples. 5
The first is Marinello v. United States, which involved § 7212(a)-the
"Omnibus Clause"-of the Internal Revenue Code. 6 Section 7212(a) criminalizes
the act of "corruptly or by force or threat of force ... obstruct[ing] or imped[ing],
or endeavor[ing] to obstruct or impede, the due administration of [taxes]." The
question in Marinello was which kinds of "obstruction" or "impediment" qualify as
predicate acts under the Omnibus Clause. In terms of actus reus, how far does the
statute reach?
According to the government, the answer was simple: the Omnibus Clause
reaches all noncompliance with tax rules. "Impediment," after all, means "a thing
that impedes," and there can be no doubt that deliberate acts of noncompliance
impede the overall administration of taxes. Of course, as the Government
acknowledged, acts of noncompliance come in many different guises, some quite
serious, others relatively innocuous. But this, the Government argued, is where the
mens rea prong comes in. To be convicted under the Omnibus Clause, it is not
enough to intend to be noncompliant; one must do so "corruptly,"
a requirement that
7
effectively renders the clause inert in garden-variety cases.
The Court disagreed. Holding for Petitioner, Justice Breyer reasoned that
"impediment" was ambiguous between: (1) the broad interpretation urged by the
government; and (2) a narrower interpretation, bolstered by a (non-textual) "nexus
requirement" between the act of impeding the "administration" of taxes and the
specific type of administration in question. Specifically, Breyer held that for an act

4.
The pattern generalizes, but with respect to the cases discussed below, see
Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1116 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Yates, 135
S.Ct. at 1098-99 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting); and City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41,
90-92 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5.
These are not the only recent examples of the Court pushing back against
extreme breadth. They are simply the clearest instances of the "breadth as uncertainty" logic.
Other recent anti-breadth cases include, for instance, Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
1918, 1923-24 (2017), in which the government argued that any "false statement" made
during the naturalization process, no matter how innocuous, and regardless of how many years
(or decades) have elapsed since the statement occurred, is a sufficient basis to revoke
someone's citizenship; and Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 852-53 (2014), in which the
government argued that a jilted spouse who tried (unsuccessfully) to use a household toxin to
give her husband's mistress an "uncomfortable rash" was guilty of "possessing and using a
chemical weapon," as proscribed by international law. See also Mellouli v. Lynch, 135 S. Ct.
1980 (2015) and Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), both of which concern a similar
but slightly distinct dynamic in the immigration context-i.e., whether extremely minor
conduct reflected in state-level convictions can, consistent with the Court's "categorical
approach," trigger deportation (and other immigration penalties).
6.
138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018).
7.
See id. at 1108.
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of noncompliance to qualify as "impeding" a tax proceeding, the "Government must
[point to a] proceeding" that is both more specific than the general, year-over-year
collection of taxes, and "pending at the time the defendant engaged in the obstructive
conduct or, at the least, was... reasonably foreseeable by the defendant." 8 Adopting
the other construction, Breyer reasoned, would cause too many cases of minor
wrongdoing to come within the statute's reach. "Interpreted broadly," wrote Breyer,
"the provision could apply to a person who pays a babysitter $41 per week in cash
without withholding taxes, leaves a large cash tip in a restaurant, fails to keep
donation receipts from every charity to which he or she contributes, or fails to
provide every record to an accountant." 9
I share the majority's dismay at this implication. But the problem,
ultimately, is not one of uncertainty. All noncompliance with tax law is, ipso facto,
an "impediment" of the "administration of [taxes]." The problem is that, taken
seriously, the Omnibus Clause would convert even the most minute instances of
shoddy record-keeping into obstruction of justice offenses carrying up to three years
of incarceration. In other words, the problem-as Justice Kagan suggested during
oral argument-is the law's "ungodly br[eadth]." 10
Another, similar example-also involving obstruction of justice-is Yates
v. United States, which concerned § 1519 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a law passed
post-Enron to stave off corporate fraud." Section 1519 criminalizes, in relevant part,
"destroy[ing] ... any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede,
obstruct, or influence" a federal investigation. 12 Mr. Yates was a less-than-righteous
boat captain in the business of, among other things, catching undersized snapper.
Realizing that the fishing and wildlife authorities were on his tail, Yates instructed
his crewmembers to throw a number of too-small fish back into the ocean, leading
to a § 1519 prosecution-on the grounds that fish are "tangible objects," and Yates
had disposed of them with the explicit purpose of evading federal law enforcement.
Yates appealed, and the Court eventually agreed with him: destroying a
few fish, while hardly virtuous, is not the sort of thing that warrants up to 20 years
in federal prison. To reach this conclusion, Justice Ginsburg explicitly leaned on the
uncertainty analogy. Although fish are definitely objects-and although it would be
hard, abiding the normal parameters of English, to call them intangible-Congress's
intent, Ginsburg reasoned, was ambiguous. And "ambiguity ... should be resolved
in favor of lenity," not "reading [§ 1519] expansively to create a coverall spoliation-

8.
Id. at 1110.
9.
Id. at 1108. For background on the babysitter example, in particular, see 26
C.F.R. § 31.3102-1(a) (2017); INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUB. No. 926, HOUSEHOLD
EMPLOYER'S TAx GUIDE FOR USE IN 2019 5-6 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p926.pdf.
10.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
1101 (2018) (No. 16-1144) ("KAGAN: .. .This statute, taken on its face, is . . . ungodly
broad").
11.
For background on the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484-87 (2010).

12.

18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2019).
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As in Marinello, the Yates Court viewed the statute as

uncertain between two readings: (1) a literal construction of "tangible objects" that
includes-gasp-all tangible objects; and (2) a finessed construction that includes

only tangible objects "used to record or preserve infornation."' 4
Once again, I share in the majority's dismay; but once again, the problem
seems not to be one of genuine uncertainty. Section 1519 may or may not be wiseI do not know-but its pitch is undeniably broad, and the phrase "tangible objects"
most certainly encompasses all tangible objects related to an ongoing investigation.
To quote Justice Kagan in dissent: "[e]ven in its most robust form, [the] rule [of
lenity] only kicks in when, after all legitimate tools of interpretation have been
exhausted, a reasonable doubt persists regarding whether Congress has made the
defendant's conduct a federal crime," but here, "[n]o such doubt lingers."' 15 And
although:
the [Court] points to the breadth of [§ 1519] as [if] breadth were
equivalent to ambiguity .... [i]t is not. Section 1519 is very broad. It
is also very clear. Every traditional tool of statutory interpretation
points in the same direction, toward 'object' meaning object [and
including fish]. Lenity offers no proper refuge from that
straightforward (even though capacious) construction. 16
The final example, at least for the moment, is City of Chicago v. Morales,
in which the Court struck down a Chicago ordinance that effectively criminalized
"loitering" by any group of people that included at least one "criminal street gang
member."' 7 To underscore the issue with this law, Justice Stevens conjured the
following hypothetical. Imagine, he wrote, "a gang member and his father" hanging
out near Wrigley Field,' 8 and then ask: are the two there because they wish (or one
of them wishes) "to rob an unsuspecting fan," or are there they "just [trying] to get
a glimpse of Sammy Sosa leaving the ballpark"?' 9 There is, Stevens argued, no way
to know. And that was just the problem-by flattening any distinction between cases
like an impending robbery and the Sammy Sosa example, the ordinance deprived

13.
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1088 (2015) (quoting Cleveland v.
United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000)).
14.
Id. at 1089.
15.
Id. at 1098-99 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (quoting Abramski v. United States, 573
U.S. 169, 204 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
16.
Id.
17.
527 U.S. 41, 45-46, 64 (1999). To be precise, the ordinance criminalized the
refusal to comply with a dispersal order from a police officer in the event that one was
loitering with any group of people that seemed to the officer to include at least one gang
member. Whether this is meaningfully distinct from an ordinance that directly prohibits
loitering-or whether it is best conceptualized as a direct anti-loitering statute that happens
to carry no direct penalty (but still makes loitering illegal, for how else would police be
justified in issuing the dispersal order?)-may be an interesting metaphysical question. But it
makes little difference in practice, since the record contained ample evidence of the ordinance
being used, in effect, to criminalize loitering. See id. at 49-51, 58.
18.
Id. at 60.
19.
Id.
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people of a meaningful opportunity to "conform[] [their] conduct to the law,""

because either way, "if [the] purpose [of the gang member and his father] is not
apparent to a nearby police officer, she may-indeed, she 'shall'-order them to
disperse. "21
Morales is styled as a vagueness case; the plurality opinion invalidated the

ordinance on that basis. But how so? In truth, the ordinance was direct and lucid. It
simply reached-as spotlighted in the Sammy Sosa example-a wide array of
conduct that no one would reasonably regard as forbidden, let alone malum in se.
Little surprise then, that halfway through the opinion, Justice Stevens performed an
about-face: abandoning the pretense that uncertainty, in the usual sense, was the
problem. Rather,
[s]ince the city cannot conceivably have meant to criminalize each
instance a citizen stands in public with a gang member, the vagueness
that dooms this ordinance is not the product of uncertainty about the
normal meaning of 'loitering,' but rather about what loitering is
22
covered by the ordinance and what is not.

The issue, in other words, was not lack of clarity. It was that the ordinance
clearly swept in "a substantial amount of innocent conduct, '23 leaving ordinary
people to guess at "what was [actually] forbidden" in practice. t

II.

DISENTANGLING BREADTH AND UNCERTAINTY

With these examples in tow, we are now in a position to trace the analytic
distinction between breadth and uncertainty more precisely. Although scholars have
been quick to criticize the Court's interpretive gymnastics in cases like Yates and
Marinello,25 the deeper point-the category error-has proven elusive. Although
20.
Id. at 58.
21.
Id. at 60.
22.
Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
23.
Id. at 60.
24.
See Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 746 (2d Cir. 2010) (describing the
Morales opinion as holding "that an anti-loitering statute that prohibited standing in public
with a gang member provided insufficient notice to a reasonable person of what was forbidden
despite the fact that the literal meaning of the statute was clear.") (emphasis added).
25.
See, e.g., Shon Hopwood, Clarity in CriminalLaw, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 695,
726-27 (2017) (using Bond and Yates to warn against the judicial "impulse to create law" and
"rewrite ... statutes" in the face of over criminalization); Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P.
Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L.
REv. 2109, 2112 (2015) (describing opinions like Bond as "tortured constructions" that "bear
little resemblance to [the] laws actually passed"); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Talking Textualism,
Practicing Pragmatism: Rethinking the Supreme Court's Approach to Statutory
Interpretation,51 GA. L. REv. 121, 177 (2016) ("The [Bond] majority purported to take a
textualist approach, but instead made up an ambiguity in the phrase 'chemical weapon' and
resolved it by considering non-textual factors.... Indeed, it is hard to imagine a more
unambiguous expression of Congress's intent than an explicit statutory definition," as was
present in Bond); Id. at 183 ("In Yates, the [interpretive] canons were deployed as window
dressing to rationalize an interpretation reached on other grounds."); cf. Ryan Doeffler, HighStakes Interpretation, 116 MICH. L. REv. 523, 539 (2018) (arguing that the Court's approach
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breadth and uncertainty often travel together, if nothing else because both can be the
byproduct of legislative laziness, 2 6 the distinction between them is categorical, and
on inspection, fairly easy to see.
The distinction is best understood by comparing how breadth and
uncertainty operate abstractly versus contextually. In the case of uncertainty, the
problem exists in the abstract, and contextualization is potentially curative.27
Consider three examples:
A.

Queens are powerful.

B.

Don't bringyour queen out too early in the game.

C.

Kings are safest when their knights stay close.

All three of these sentences are uncertain. Sentence A is ambiguous because
it could refer to human royalty or, equally, to chess. Sentence B is vague because,
while clearly referring to chess, it produces a set of hard-to-parse middle casesreasonable minds may disagree about what qualifies as "too early." And sentence C
is both ambiguous and vague. Not only is it unclear if the advice is directed to heads
of state or to chess players, it is also unclear (on either construction) how "close" is
28
close enough to ensure safety.
By the same token, all three sentences become more certain the more one
knows about the context. In the case of Sentence A, this is obvious; one hardly needs
to know anything, just a few background facts, to determine if the speaker of the
phrase is talking about monarchy or about a board game. Things are slightly more
complicated with Sentences B and C-but only slightly. An experienced player
(who agreed with the advice of Sentence B) would have little difficulty, in the
context of a particular game, deciding whether it was "too early" to bring out her
queen. The same goes for Sentence C. It is only in the abstract that keeping one's
knights "close" to one's king is a vague mandate. In actual play, the vagueness
evaporates.

to interpretive questions changes in "higher-stakes" contexts, leading to diagnoses of
"ambiguity" where the Court might otherwise view language as unambiguous). But see
Richard M. Re, The New Holy Trinity, 18 GREENBAG 2d 407,409-13 (2015) (describing Bond
and Yates as examples of a newly-revived purposivist trend in statutory interpretation).
26.
See David Kwok, Is Vagueness Choking the White Collar Statute?, 53 GA.L.
REv. 495, 504-08 (2018) (offering a preliminary account of the distinction between
vagueness and breadth, while also arguing that the two problems tend to travel together).
27.
This does not necessarily mean, of course, that all indeterminacy can be
eliminated through contextualization. Certain forms of vagueness, especially, are fated to
persist-since vagueness is an affirmative tool of language.
28.
For further background on the vagueness-ambiguity distinction, see KEES VAN
DEEMTER, NOT EXACTLY: IN PRAISE OF VAGUENESS

110-15 (2010); Lawrence B. Solum, The

Interpretation-ConstructionDistinction, 27 CONST. CMT. 95, 97-98 (2010) (discussing the
distinction in the context of legal interpretation). See also Jill C. Anderson, MisreadingLike
A Lawyer: Cognitive Bias in Statutory Interpretation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (2014)
(exploring different sources of ambiguity in language and in law).
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When it comes to breadth, on the other hand, contextualization does not
solve the problem-it creates it. What makes a rule or heuristic seem overly broad
is not its abstract meaning but its operation in context: the implausible-seeming
results to which it leads.
In this vein, consider a fourth sentence:
D.

In chess, never exchange your queen for a bishop.

29

This sentence is certain; it furnishes clear advice. If an expert chess player
(let's call him Magnus) were to express doubt about the "certainty" of Sentence D,
he would not be talking about the rule's abstract meaning. Rather, he would be
pointing to its operation in context. Imagine, for example, a circumstance in which
trading one's queen for a bishop immediately enables checkmate. Surely-we can
imagine Magnus saying-it would be ludicrous to follow the advice in that case!
The whole point of the advice is to maximize one's odds of winning the game. If the
advice comes manifestly into collision with that goal, clearly it is the goal, not the
advice, that should triumph. However plain the meaning of Sentence D might be, it
would be silly to follow the rule in a case where flouting it, instead, enables victory.
The key point, however, is what kind of objection this represents. Were
Magnus to conclude that Sentence D should not apply across the board, 30 he would
not be making a descriptive claim about the rule's content. He would be making a
normative claim about the rule's wisdom. More precisely, Magnus would be
suggesting that the rule, as formulated, is context-insensitive; that is, he (and we)
can imagine a different version of the rule-call it Sentence D-that delivers the
same substantive command but narrows its reach by distinguishing the set of cases
(Set X) in which the command makes normative sense from the set of cases (Set )
in which it does not. So, for instance, Sentence D' might read (per the example
above): "Never let your queen be captured by a bishop, unless doing so forces
checkmate." Or it might read: "Never let your queen be captured by a bishop, unless
you stand to capture four of your opponent's pieces in response." And so on; the
variations are infinite. The point is that Sentence D', whatever its content, would not
be an interpretation of Sentence D. It would be a different claim-a more contextsensitive version of the rule, attending, in a way the original rule does not, to the
normative differences between Set X and Set Y.
The same is not true of Sentences A, B, or C. In those cases, the problem is
linguistic, not normative, which makes it possible to imagine counterfactual
29.
At first, I formulated this example as "Never let your queen be captured by a
bishop," and then as "Never exchange your queen for a bishop." But one commentator pointed
out that a human monarch could, in principle, be detained by a ranking member of the clergy,
and likewise, there could be situations (involving hostages, say) in which the exchange of a
queen for a bishop, though inadvisable generally, might prove efficacious-rendering the
original sentence ambiguous in addition to broad. Chastened, and with newfound appreciation
for the difficulties faced by lawmakers, I decided to modify the example.
30.
Note that I am assuming, arguendo, that Magnus believes the rule should apply
in some cases; in other words, he does not think the rule is completely void of merit. This
assumption is harmless for my purposes because in practice, courts will rarely, if ever, deal
with rules that have no valid applications. But it still makes a conceptual difference. If the
rule applied to no cases whatsoever, a different analysis might follow.
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versions-Sentence A', Sentence B', and Sentence C-that solve the problem by
clarifying the content of the relevant sentence without pronouncing on (or even
inquiring into) its wisdom. So, for example, Sentence A' might read: "In the game
of chess, queens are powerful." Or, more convolutedly: "Queens are powerful, and
when I say 'queen,' I mean a chess piece." Likewise, Sentence B' might read
(perhaps based on data from a poll of grandmasters): "Don't bring your queen out
until move seven or eight." And Sentence C'-with apologies to the English
language-might read: "Kings, that is, the most vulnerable of chess pieces, are safest
when their knights stay close, by which I mean no more than three columns or rows
away."
With modifications like these, Sentences A, B, and C would become
certain; the linguistic infirmity would disappear. The resulting claims may be true
or false, and the advice they furnish-for example, to maintain a relatively small
distance on the board between one's knight(s) and one's king-may be wise or
foolish. Regardless, Sentences A', B', and C' dissolve the uncertainty by further
specifying the content of the original claims. This again stands in contrast to
Sentence D', which did not specify the content of Sentence D so much as transform
it. The original rule was plenty clear. The problem was that following it, in some
cases, would lead to crazy results. In other words, the problem was inescapably
normative; it reflected an intuition about how granular a rule ought to be, not an
interpretive judgment about how granular the rule, as drafted, actually is.
So, pulling everything together, the four sentences coalesce into a
taxonomy of indeterminacy and breadth:
A.

Queens are powerful.

B.

Don't bringyour queen out too early in the game.

C.

Kings are safest when their knights stay close.

D. In chess, never tradeyour queen for a bishop.

Sentence

Indeterminate or
Broad?

Specific Problem

Source of
Problem

A

Indeterminate

Ambiguity

Linguistic

B

Indeterminate

Vagueness

Linguistic

C

Indeterminate

Ambiguity &
Vagueness

Linguistic

D

Broad

Context-Normative
Insensitivity

To put this back into conversation with the case law, recall Yates, which
held that fish do not qualify (for purposes of Sarbanes-Oxley) as "tangible objects."
In so holding, the plurality was able to circumvent the larger issue at the heart of the
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case. It had no occasion to ask whether a statute that treats the destruction of fish as
equivalent to a systematic corporate cover-up-and imposes a penalty of up to 20
years in federal prison for both-is coarse in a manner that offends due process. The
question was, so to speak, moot. By reading "fish" out of the statutory scheme
entirely, the plurality reserved the breadth issue for another day.
A clever fix-but reserving the issue for another day is not the same as
resolving it. 3 Even assuming, arguendo, that the plurality's gambit can dispose of
the specific facts of Yates, there are certainly some facts that would continue to raise
alarm about context-insensitivity, even after the application of narrowing canons.
Suppose, for instance, that Mr. (Captain?) Yates, having realized the authorities
were on his trail, ordered his crew to destroy photos of noncompliant fish rather than
actual fish. 2 In that case, the plurality's logic would falter. The very same canons
of construction that Justice Ginsburg marshaled to limit "tangible objects" to those
'
"used to record or preserve information" 33
would, when applied to photos, yield an
inculpatory rather than lenient result. So too, for example, with respect to an
executive's decision to discard a financially de minimis but embarrassing receipt
(say, for pornography purchased in a hotel room using a company credit card during
an SEC investigation)-or a homeowner's decision, on the eve of an IRS audit,3 to
4
delete emails that indicate ongoing-but-unrecorded cash payments to a gardener.
All of these examples, like Yates itself, involve very minor conduct,
relative both to the culpability on display in the statute's paradigm case- systematic
corporate fraud-and to the severity of the attendant penalty. But unlike Yates, there
is no obvious linguistic fix to the fish-photos case, the pornography-receipt case, or
the gardener-email case. They cannot be resolved with interpretive canons. The
problem of context-insensitivity persists, forcing us to confront the constitutional
issue head-on: that when Congress enacted § 1519, its "evident purpose ... [was] to
punish those who alter or destroy physical evidence-any physical evidence-with
the intent of thwarting federal law enforcement."3 5 The question is whether that sort
of purpose, as expressed in the vastness of the resulting law, harmonizes with the
requirements of due process. And the answer, at least in extreme cases, is no.

III. THE INSUFFICIENCY OF NOTICE
Fair enough-one might say-but so what? The Yates Court had no trouble
finding something amiss about applying Sarbanes-Oxley to snapper-destruction;
likewise with the other cases from Part I. What does it matter if courts adopt the
labels of "ambiguity" and "vagueness," or if they apply (modified) versions of the

31.
See, e.g., Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 25 (unpacking this distinction in the
context of avoidance); Anita Krishnakumar, Passive Avoidance, 71 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (connecting this point explicitly to Bond and Yates).
32.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 20-22, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct.
1074 (2015) (No. 13-745 1) (analyzing different variations of this hypothetical).
33.
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1089 (2015).
34.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4-5, 11-13, Marinello v. United States,
138 S.Ct. 1101 (2018) (No. 16-1144) (discussing numerous versions of the gardener
hypothetical).
35.
Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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rule of lenity and void-for-vagueness doctrine? The important thing, functionally
speaking, is that the problem found a cure.
I do not mean to conjure a strawman here, for the rejoinder points to
something important: there is a good deal of overlap between breadth and
uncertainty. Notwithstanding the distinction traced in the last Part, both phenomena
hail from the same conceptual and doctrinal "family": that of due process. Yet as we
will see, the two phenomena also pull apart at a normative level, raising distinct
concerns and calling for different modes of judicial intervention.
A. From Kafka to Orwell
With uncertainty, the problem is notice. Even on the (highly indulgent)6
3
assumption that members of the public actually read statutes and regulations,
ambiguity and vagueness frustrate their ability to make sense of those materials.
This worry spans to the early days of common law,37 and its institutional specter is
the Star Chamber: a system of adjudication that, whatever its merits, operates behind
closed doors, leaving subjects to guess after its operation-and causing the risk of
abuse to loom large. As Justice Gorsuch recently argued, when people are "[left] in
the dark about what the law demands," it "invites the exercise of arbitrary power"
by "allowing prosecutors and courts" to simply "make [the law] up."38
The literary touchstone here is Kafka. Although he is certainly not the only
writer to warn of the oppression-and absurdity-that can result from opaque legal
systems, his work remains the most vivid. Particularly so The Trial,39 which follows
the well-meaning but hapless Josef K, who finds himself caught up in a prosecution
for an unknown crime within an elusive and alienating judicial system. The book is
an elaborate, and bitterly funny, cautionary tale about what can happen when
"faceless bureaucrac[ies] ... make ... consequential decisions" for parties with "no
understanding" of, or "no input" in, the process.40
The Trial is fiction, obviously, and hyperbolic fiction at that. But it
illustrates an important point about actual legal systems. When people "lack ... any
meaningful form of participation" over their legal fates, feelings of "powerlessness

36.
See, e.g., Hopwood, supra note 25, at 731 ("People who commit crimes malum
in se do so knowing that what they are doing is wrong, and likely illegal, without consulting
the U.S. Code. As Justice Holmes has acknowledged, it is something of a fiction to believe
that criminals will carefully consider a statute's text before they murder or steal."); see also
Zachary Price, The Rule ofLenity as a Rule of Structure,72 FORDHAM L. REv. 885, 886 (2004)
(pointing out that people rarely read laws, which puts strain on the notice argument against
ambiguity).
37.
See, e.g., Hopwood, supra note 25, at 715-18 (tracing the history of the "fair
notice" principle).
38.
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223-24 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring
in judgment).
39.
FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1925).
40.
Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1118 (2019).
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and vulnerability" are quick to follow. 4' As David Luban, Alan Strudler, and David
Wasserman put it, one of the central purposes of law is securing "what we might
call the moral intelligibility of our lives," and the "horror of the bureaucratic
process," depicted with such lurid panache by Kafka, is not so much "officials'
mechanical adherence to duty" as "individual[s']
ignorance" of what is permitted,
42
prohibited, and required of them as citizens.
Breadth gestures toward a very different concern. Extremely broad statutes
are not worrisome for being opaque; they are worrisome for being oppressive. The
issue is not one of unclear legal commands. In fact, the commands of a broad law
are often quite clear. The problem is that they are draconian. They invite too much
interference with everyday life. Indeed, broad laws often show their power-and
become fearsome-precisely through clarity. There is a particular kind of dread, a
"Sword of Damocles" dynamic, 43 that accompanies an enforcement system which
may come swooping into private life at any moment; but then again, which may not.
Here, the literary echo is not Kafka, but Orwell.' As Winston Smith makes
his way in Oceania, the state apparatus he encounters is not secret or arbitrary. Its
requirements, stark as they are, sit perfectly out in the open-so much so that
Winston spends a large quantity of his time and energy trying to comply, and
worrying about whether Party leaders have noticed his lapses. Winston's world, in
this respect, is quite different
from Josef K's. It is the intelligible but nightmarish
45
world of a police state.
B. Broad Laws as General Warrants
Orwell was not just indulging his imagination; of course, he was capturing
a real-world problem, one that too many populations, both past and present, have
had to endure as a condition of everyday life. Our nation has largely managed to
avoid collapsing into a police state. Yet the core danger-of a world in which the
power of law enforcement officials is limited only by their whim and discretion-is
hardly foreign to our constitutional history. In fact, the Fourth Amendment was
ratified explicitly in response to the "Crown's practice of using general warr ants and

41.
Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors
for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1423 (2001).
42.
David Luban, Alan Strudler & David Wasserman, Moral Responsibility in the
Age of Bureaucracy,90 MICH. L. REv. 2348, 2354 (1992).

43.
On this theme, Kiel Brennan-Marquez & Stephen Henderson, Fourth
Amendment Anxiety, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1, 26-28 (2018) (arguing that the Constitution
protects us not only from certain exercises of state power, but also certain threats of the
exercise of state power-e.g., in the double jeopardy context-and this tells us something
about the normative stakes of due process).
44.
See GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
45.
For background on the resonance of 1984 to U.S. constitutional lawespecially criminal procedure-see Margaret Hu, Orwell's 1984 and a Fourth Amendment
Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test, 92 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1819, 1860-75 (2017)
(describing, among other things, judicial invocation of 1984 as a normative anchor for search
and seizure analysis).
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writs of assistance, ' '4 6 royal decrees that gave British soldiers and other agents of the
Crown boundless authority to perform searches across entire townships.47 The
colonists despised this practice, and the Founders crafted a particularized warrant
requirement precisely to banish the practice of unfettered police surveillance-in
other words, precisely to hedge against what, by the twentieth century, we would
48
come to call a police state.
The iniquities of general warrants are manifold. For one thing, they permit
ongoing disruption of everyday life. 49 For another, they render officials
unaccountable by alleviating the burden of giving reasons for specific targeting
decisions, a dynamic that leads both to more hassle of innocent people and to a
significant risk of biased or discriminatory policing.50 Most importantly however,
the threat of boundless discretion makes it impossible to participate fully in social
and political life. For the same reason that privacy intrusions have long been

46.
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 560 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 466-68
(2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (documenting copious authority for the proposition that general
warrants were the Fourth Amendment's specific target during the Founding Era); Paul Ohm,
Massive Hard Drives, General Warrants, and the Power of Magistrate Judges, 97 VA. L.
REv. IN BRIEF 1, 10 n.37 (2011) (compiling sources to the same effect); Scott Sundby,
Protecting the Citizen "Whilst He is Quiet": Suspicionless Searches, "Special Needs" and
General Warrants,74 Miss. L. J. 501, 509 (2004) (suggesting that the "concern over general

warrants ... suppl[ies] a theoretical and historical underpinning" for Fourth Amendment
law).

47.

For an excellent historical background, see Thomas Davies, Recovering the

OriginalFourthAmendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547, 655-60 (1999). See also Akhil R. Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles,107 HARv. L. REv. 757, 771-781 (1994) (exploring the

Amendment's historical foundations-as a response to general warrants-through the prism
of Wilkes v. Woods).
48.
Id.; see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) ("The ... purpose
of [the Amendment's] particularity requirement was to prevent general searches. By limiting
the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause
to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications,
and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the [f]ramers
intended to prohibit."); Thomas P. Crocker, The PoliticalFourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U.
L. REv. 303, 308 (2010) ("Privacy is no doubt an important constitutional value .... But
privacy exclusiveness ignores a 'more majestic conception' of the Fourth Amendment that
protects a political 'right of the people' to organize community life free from pervasive
government surveillance and interference.") (citing Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,
151 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
49.
See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REv. 461, 487-90 (2014) (arguing
that "hassle"-everyday disruption and intrusion-should be the focal point of Fourth
Amendment harm); see also Kiel Brennan-Marquez, The ConstitutionalLimits of Private
Surveillance, 66 KAN. L. REv. 485, 492-95 (2018) (tracing this dynamic).
50.
See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, "PlausibleCause ": ExplanatoryStandards in the
Age of Powerful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REv. 1249 (2017) (arguing that the Fourth
Amendment is primarily about requiring police to give reasons for wielding intrusive power);
see also Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONT. PROB. 107, 124-25
(2010) (detailing the discriminatory potential of dragnet surveillance).
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understood to hobble individual autonomy," they also limit collective autonomy;
52
they frustrate the ability of affected communities to engage in meaningful self-rule.
It is hardly accidental that the general warrants which so enraged the founding
generation were those aimed at investigating "seditious" activity. The contemporary
synonym for seditious is, of course, democratic.
Extremely broad laws pose a similar threat. Like general warrants, they
equip enforcement officials with a tool-a piece of paper-that provides automatic
legal justification for widespread, and potentially discriminatory, intrusion into
private life. Consider, for example, the anti-gang ordinance at issue in City of
Chicago v. Morales (discussed in more detail above in Part I), which criminalized
the act of congregating in public, for any purpose and any length of time, with any
group of people that contained at least one known gang member. In certain
neighborhoods, this ordinance operated, in effect, as blanket license for police to
harass (or not-at their whim) virtually any group of people convened in public. As
with a general warrant, the problem was not that affected parties did not know they
might be hassled. They did know; the law was on the books, and perfectly clear
about its (strict) demands. The problem was that the form of power resulting from
53
the law was inadequately particularized and, functionally, almost unbounded.
In this sense, the similarity between broad laws and general warrants lays
bare the insufficiency of "notice" to fully vindicate due-process values. Notice is
clearly important; for the reasons elaborated above, lack of notice leads to opacity
51.
See, e.g., Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1934, 1935 (2013) (arguing that state surveillance "chill[s] the exercise of... civil liberties,"
especially related to expression and association, and that, when watched, people tend to avoid
,experiment[ing] with new, controversial, or deviant ideas"); see also Kathy J. Strandburg,
Home, Home on the Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial
Change, 70 MD. L. REv. 614, 626-34 (2011) (exploring the breakdown in social life that
surveillance can occasion). For a classic account of this dynamic, see MICHEL FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 77, 213-24 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995)
(1977).
52.
See, e.g., Julie Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REv. 1904, 1912
(2013) ("A society that permits the unchecked ascendancy of surveillance infrastructures
cannot hope to remain a liberal democracy," but instead will be "replaced, gradually but
surely, by a different form of government that [we could] call modulated democracy"modulated, that is, "by powerful commercial and political interests" that shut down
"meaningful agendas for human flourishing"); see also Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d
277, 289-92, 295 (2015) (holding that allegations of religiously targeted surveillance are
sufficient to establish an injury-in-fact, due to the chilling effect on association that such
surveillance can have); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.,
357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (barring
Alabama from demanding access to NAACP membership rolls as a condition of continuing
to operate in the state, insofar as the demand curtailed "the right of [the NAACP's] members
to pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others"); FRANK
PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND
INFORMATION 189-90 (2015).

53.
See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 49-51 (1999) (canvassing the
sheer breadth of-and police omnipresence resulting from-the anti-loitering ordinance,
including the fact that during just three years of enforcement, the Chicago PD issued almost
90,000 dispersal orders and performed more than 40,000 arrests pursuant to the ordinance).
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and unpredictability, culminating in the horror of the Star Chamber and the absurdity
of Kafka. For good reason do courts entertain challenges to statutory uncertainty,
particularly in the criminal setting.
By itself, however, notice is not enough." 4 General warrants, after all, are
instruments of notice. The point of a general warrant-by contrast to a regime in
which law enforcement officials simply perform searches without any ex ante
authorization-was to warn people that they should expect intrusion whenever, and
however often, such officials decide to pursue it. This hardly seems like the vaunted
sort of "notice" that due-process principles evoke. But that is just the point. To be
told, in advance, that the state may intrude on your life is certainly important, but
also cold comfort when the message becomes, in effect, that intrusion could come
at any time. When law enforcement has the quality of a lightning strike-casting a
pall of dread over everyday life, even if specific enforcement actions remain rare as
a statistical matter-something has gone wrong.

IV. CONSTRAINING BREADTH IN PRACTICE
So what is to be done? If, following the Supreme Court, we take seriously
that extreme breadth is inconsistent with due process, but we also acknowledge that
breadth is different from uncertainty-making tools designed for the latter a poor fit
for the former-what is the best path forward?
Generally speaking, judges have two options when confronting extremely
broad statutes. The first, and currently favored approach, is to adopt limiting
constructions; to address the issue at the layer of enforcement, by reconfiguring how
officials wield a given statute. The second, more promising option, is to address the
problem at the layer of enactment-by dismantling extremely broad statutes in their
entirety.
A. Reading Narrowly
The first means of reining in extreme breadth is narrow reading. The idea
is simple, and its appeal is plain. Namely, the application of broad statutes can be
cleaned on the back end; by waiting until enforcement authorities actually try to
wield broad laws-and by pushing back against such efforts when they prove
excessive-courts can limit the damage, so to speak, of extreme statutory breadth.
And they can do so without undoing the relevant legislature's handiwork. Narrow
reading was the Court's preferred strategy in both Marinello and Yates when it
determined, respectively, that not all "impediments" count as impeding under the
Omnibus Clause of the IRC, and not all "tangible objects" take the right worldly
form for criminal liability under § 1519 of Sarbanes-Oxley.
The narrow strategy also enjoys favor among scholars. For some, the idea
traces to fairness. Courts, the reasoning goes, should counteract overzealous
enforcement by shielding minor instances of wrongdoing from criminal liability, no

54.
See William Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of CriminalLaw, 100 MICH. L.
REv. 505, 559-61 (2001) (explaining that legislative "specificity" in no way guarantees
reasonableness of scope).
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matter the literal bounds of the relevant statute 55-a proposition that finds some
support in recent jurisprudence. 56 For others, the issue is not one of fairness, but
delegation. If enforcement officials are conceptualized as agents of lawmakers, the
goal of courts, in fashioning limiting principles, should be to tether executive power
to legislative authorization. Mila Sohoni has dubbed this the "faithful enforcement"
view of statutory interpretation: the idea that officials are "not merely required to
'take care' that the laws be executed, but also to do so faithfully," by channeling the
wishes of the relevant legislative body. 57 Take this mandate seriously, and
prosecutions like those in Yates become untenable-clearly beyond the scope of
enforcement authority that Congress58 plausibly meant to vest. Indeed, this is part
what makes the cases feel so absurd.

55.
See, e.g., Anna Roberts, Dismissals as Justice, 69 ALA. L. REv. 327, 330
(2017) (arguing that judges in their supervisory capacity over prosecutors and other law
enforcement officials should-and in many states, do-have the authority to dismiss criminal
charges on grounds of fundamental fairness); Joshua Kleinfeld, Equitable Arguments and
Criminal Statutes (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing and defending
an equitably driven "narrow reading" strategy); see also RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE
46-48 (1986) (providing a philosophical argument in favor of equitable interpretation).
56.
One recent example is Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1918, 1923-24
(2017), in which the Court rejected the government's claim that a statute (1) forbidding noncitizens from "procur[ing] naturalization" in a manner "contrary to law," and (2) penalizing
the offense by revoking the offender's citizenship, reaches any omission or misrepresentation
made during the naturalization process, no matter how innocuous, and regardless of how
many years (or even decades) have elapsed since the statement occurred. It would be unfair,
the Court reasoned, to strip the citizenship of a successful applicant who simply, say,
neglected to disclose every violation of traffic laws, or who "fill[ed] out the necessary
paperwork in a government office with a knife tucked away in her handbag (but never
mentioned or used)," thus violating "[laws] criminalizing the possession of a weapon in a
federal building"-even though both offenses arguably fall within the statute's literal scope.
Id. at 1926; see Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-30, Maslenjak v. United States, 137 S. Ct.
1918 (No. 16-309) ("[C.J.] ROBERTS: I looked at... the naturalization form, [and] there is
a question. It's Number 22. 'Have you ever... committed, assisted in committing, or
attempted to commit a crime or offense for which you were not arrested?' Some time ago,
outside of the statute of limitations, I drove 60 miles an hour in a 55-mile-an-hour zone [but]
I was not arrested. Now, you say that if I answer [question 22] no, 20 years after I was
naturalized as a citizen, you can knock on my door and say, guess what, you're not an
American citizen after all. [COUNSEL]: Well - [C.J.] ROBERTS: Is that right?
[COUNSEL]: [W]ell, I would say two things. First, that is how the government would
interpret that [question], that it would require you to disclose those sorts of offenses. [C.J.]
ROBERTS: Oh, come on. You're saying that on this form, you expect everyone to list every
time in which they drove over the speed limit .... [or] we can take away your citizenship").
57.
Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REv. 31, 89-91 (2017); see also Price,
supra note 36, at 886 (discussing the "legislative supremacy" rationale for the rule of lenity,
which imagines courts-resolving ambiguities in favor of defendants-as enforcers of
legislative will). For a judicial elaboration of the same idea, see United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971).
58.
See Kleinfeld, supra note 55, at 7 (describing the prosecution's theory in Bond
as "just ... sort of odd').
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Yet narrow reading has two important drawbacks: one pragmatic, the other
more conceptual. The pragmatic drawback is that it provides quite little, if anything,
by the way of proactive relief; for people who (1) are potentially subject to an
extremely broad statutory scheme, but (2) have not been prosecuted-or, having
been prosecuted, are not willing or able to challenge the scheme on the back endnarrow reading in other cases accomplishes little. In other words, the strategy is
case-specific. It tackles the problem at the layer of enforcement, by waiting for
officials to wield broad statutes in especially aggressive or egregious ways. Valuable
as this may be for individual defendants (or arrestees), it hardly addresses the
problem across cases.
This brings us to the conceptual drawback of narrow reading: namely, it
rests on an implausible theory of legislative behavior, and of the resultant
relationship between legislative and executive power. In a world where lawmakers
tended to draft well-tailored, proportional statutes, and the "breadth problem" was
really just an issue of (all too common) executive overreach, narrow reading might
have been sufficient; for it would essentially involve judges reining in prosecutorsby holding them accountable to legislative will. Indeed, this is exactly what the
delegation model, discussed a moment ago, would counsel.
The problem, put simply, is that ours is not a world where lawmakers tend
to draft well-tailored, proportional statutes. Particularly in the realm of criminal law,
the tendency is just the opposite, because lawmakers have a two-fold incentive to
enact extremely broad laws. First and foremost, breadth is a powerful regulatory
tool.59 It is a useful means of capturing hard-to-formalize crimes, like fraud, 6 and
of combatting entrepreneurial wrongdoing. 61 Second, broad laws allow lawmakers
to pass the buck: reaping the benefits of discretion without having to answer for its
externalities. When laws are enforced to the public's liking, legislatures typically
receive credit, 62 but when laws are enforced overzealously (or otherwise
unreasonably), blame can easily be deflected to prosecutors. 63 If anything,
59.

See Samuel Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth,83 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1491, 1492-

94 (2007) (exploring the regulatory benefits of extremely broad laws).
60.
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup.
CT. REv. 345, 373-78 (exploring the ways in which fraud evolves and, accordingly, defies

formalization).
61.
See id.; see also Kwok, supra note 26, at 507-15.
62.
See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102
CoLuM. L. REv. 2162, 2193 (2002) ("Most legislatures and their polities are hostile to
criminal defendants ....[I]f
one had to make an educated estimate (and given the premise of
ambiguity, one must), one might perhaps even conclude that in ambiguous cases the
legislature would likely prefer a 'rule of severity'-the greater punishment for the criminal
defendant."); see also Jeff Love, Comment, FairNotice About FairNotice, 121 YALE L. J.
2395, 2395-97 (2012) (explaining that many state legislatures have explicitly barred their
own courts from applying the rule of lenity, or its equivalent).
63.
See, e.g., Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REv.
1497, 1516-30 (2007) (tracing these delegation dynamics in greater detail); Hopwood, supra
note 25, at 702-09; Price, supra note 36, at 911 ("Legislators face intense pressure to expand
the reach of criminal law. Not only do criminal statutes score political points with a 'tough
on crime' electorate; they also help avert the political risk that serious misconduct will go
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lawmakers face penalties for failing to be sufficiently harsh on crime.' This only
compounds the temptation among legislatures to err in favor of inclusion rather than
exclusion, when it comes to the formulation of criminal statutes.
Taking these dynamics seriously makes it clear why narrow reading is an
insufficient answer to the problem of statutory breadth. Put simply, it attacks the
symptom-individual instances of excess-instead of the underlying cause. In fact,
narrow reading actually stands to exacerbate the problem, compounding rather than
counteracting the legislative tendency toward broad drafting. If legislators can rely
on judges to clean up messes on the backend, what incentive is there to refine the
drafting process up front?
B. Holding Statutes "Void-for-Breadth"
There is a better way. Rather than curtailing the application of extremely
broad laws case by case, courts can limit legislative authority to enact such laws in
the first place. Call it the "void-for-breadth" rule. And as far as its practical operation
is concerned, lower-court jurisprudence provides some clues. Consider a few recent
examples:
1. In 2003, the Fourth Circuit invalidated (as applied) a law
prohibiting "loitering on bridges," which was being used to, among
other things, target protestors.65 The problem, the court argued, was
not "uncertainty about the normal meaning of 'loitering,"' but rather,
uncertainty about "what specific conduct is covered by the statute and
what is not," since the latter no less than the former fails to "give
plaintiffs [i.e., protestors] proper notice that the core political
66
speech.., in which they were engaged was prohibited by law."
2. In 2007, Judge Magnuson of the District of Minnesota invalidated
a garden-variety traffic ordinance that forbade trucks from "idling"
but "provide[d] no reference to determine how long a... vehicle may

unpunished because prosecutors lack the tools to attack it .... The result is a sort of hydraulic
pressure pushing criminal legislation towards unreasonable extremes. In the absence of any
political force to check the incentives to criminalize, legislatures have steadily expanded the
domain of liability, sweeping ever broader ranges of unremarkable conduct within criminal
law's bounds."); see also Orin Kerr, Vagueness Challengesto the Computer FraudandAbuse
Act, 94 MINN. L. REv. 1561, 1561-62 (2010) (using computer crimes as an illustrative study
to highlight the structural benefits of vagueness challenges); Kahan, supra note 60, at 347
(arguing against the rule of lenity on the grounds that its sole purpose is to enforce a structural
boundary, so it should be replaced by an anti-delegation principle that directly advances that
purpose).
64.
See, e.g., Hopwood, supra note 25, at 727 ("Congress generally has no
incentive to craft criminal legislation narrowly because, if a noteworthy crime occurs and
federal statutes do not adequately cover the conduct, then Congress is viewed as having failed
to do its job. Nor is there an effective lobbying group for the crafting of careful and
narrow criminal legislation. As a result, Congress pushes the bounds of statutory vagueness
and ambiguity"-and, I would add, statutory breadth).
65.
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 2003).
66.
Id. at 469 (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57 (1999)).
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idle" as they are wont to do "before [a] violat[ion] [occurs] ."6
The problem was that truck drivers were left simply to guess "[which]
idling is covered by the ordinance" and
which is not: an unacceptable
68
result under the Due Process Clause.
3. In 2008, Judge Moore of the Southern District of Florida struck
down a "school safety zone" ordinance that prohibited "person[s]
who [do] not have legitimate [school-related] business" from coming
within 500 feet of a school.6 9 Once again, the problem was not the
ordinance's language per se; school-related business may not be a
perfectly sharp category, but it conveys a recognizable cluster of
activities. Instead, the problem was that lots of spaces "sidewalks,
residential houses and streets, businesses, and parking lots"
formally within the school safety zone were also, in practice, spaces
in which non-school-related business was likely to occur.70 In light of
this, Judge Moore concluded that the legislature had taken too
blunderbuss of an approach. Although the ordinance had many valid
applications, and was likely motivated by important policy goals, the
result was dramatically over-inclusive; it flouted the minimal
requirements of due process.
These are not isolated examples; similar patterns have emerged in
numerous state jurisdictions as well.7 ' In all three cases, however, the lower courtsconstrained by vertical stare decisis-followed in the Supreme Court's footsteps by
treating breadth as a species of uncertainty to square the doctrinal circle. In the antiloitering case, for example, the Fourth Circuit spoke of "fair warning," and of
"notice that ... enable[s] citizens to conform their behavior to [the] law."17 2 But
notice was not actually an issue in the case because the statute was perfectly clear
about what it prohibited: any loitering on bridges. As the State of Virginia argued in
67.
Metro Producer Distribs., Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 473 F. Supp. 2d 955,
962 (D. Minn. 2007).
Id.
68.
69.
Gray v. Kohl, 568 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1383, 1395 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
70.
See id. at 1388.
71.
See, e.g., Brown v. Municipality of Anchorage, 584 P.2d 35, 37 (Alaska 1978)
(invalidating an anti-solicitation statute on the grounds that, taken literally, it would reach so
far as to criminalize "window shopping, or standing on a street corner to wait for a bus," if
carried out by "a formerly convicted prostitute or panderer"); City of Seattle v. Drew, 423
P.2d 522, 525 (Wash. 1967) (holding that a Seattle anti-loitering ordinance that "imposes
sanctions on conduct that [is] not... unlawful" runs afoul of due process-or in other words,
that the "language of the ordinance is too broad; it is vague"). Another recent example, from
the Supreme Court of Guam, was the invalidation of a family law statute that criminalizes,
among other things, "placing a family [member] or household member in fear of bodily
injury." People v. Shimizu, No. CRA15-034, 2017 WL 4390303, at *2 (Guam Sept. 5, 2017).
While the phrase was "not vague in the sense that it does not have a common and accepted
meaning," the court held that the "legislature cannot conceivably have meant to criminalize
each instance in which a citizen places a family or household member in fear of bodily
injury," leaving "too much uncertainty about what conduct is covered by the statute and what
is not." Id. at *7 (emphasis added).
72.
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 468 (4th Cir. 2003).
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defense of the statute, it "plainly prohibits loitering"-all loitering-"on designated
bridges, and ...a person of ordinary intelligence [would] understand[] perfectly
well what [that] means."73 True enough; but the actual problem, as in Marinello,
Yates, and Morales, was the breadth of the law's demands, not its failure to make
those demands clear.
Likewise with the anti-idling and school-safety-zone ordinances, there, too,
the respective courts invoked uncertainty principles -specifically,
the finessed
notion of "vagueness" from Morales-tojustify their holdings. But they were also
remarkably candid about the nature of the problem. In the anti-idling case, for
example, Judge Magnuson acknowledged forthrightly that the problem was not lack
of clarity about what "idling" means. 74 Rather, it was that:
the ordinance fails to provide quantitative parameters that define the
duration of prohibited idling or the amount of time between when the
vehicle stops and when idling becomes prohibited. This vagueness
provides city officials unfettered discretion to apply the ordinance in
an arbitrary manner. For example, an official could cite one motor
vehicle for remaining stationary one minute and pass over
another
75
motor vehicle that remained stationary for thirty minutes.
Yes, save for one caveat: the problem, pace Judge Magnuson, is not
actually "vagueness." It is breadth. The better argument, therefore-the argument
that is both more exact conceptually and truer to the normative concerns traced in
the last Part-would be as follows:
the ordinance fails to provide quantitative parameters that define the
duration of prohibited idling or the amount of time between when the
vehicle stops and when idling becomes prohibited. This breadth
provides city officials unfettered discretion to apply the ordinance in
an arbitrary manner ....
The same is true, moreover, of Morales itself-the Supreme Court case that
propelled these lower-court opinions. In Morales, the plurality's central argument
was that city officials in Chicago could not "conceivably have meant to criminalize
each instance a citizen stands in public with a gang member," leaving ordinary
people to guess "what loitering is covered by the ordinance and what is not." 76 There
is, however, a minor but important sleight-of-hand here. It is hardly inconceivable
that the Chicago City Council meant to criminalize every instance of standing in
public with a gang member. In fact, the record suggested an epidemic of gang

73.
Id. at 469.
74.
Metro Produce Distribs. v. City of Minneapolis, 473 F. Supp. 2d 955, 961 (D.
Minn. 2007) ("Because the ordinary meaning of "idling" may be applied to interpret the
ordinance, the lack of an express definition is not a constitutional flaw") (citing St. Croix
Waterway Ass'n v. Meyer, 178 F.3d 515, 520 (8th Cir. 1999) ("The requirement of reasonable
certainty does not preclude the use of ordinary terms to express ideas which find adequate
interpretation in common usage and understanding.")).
75.
Id.
76.
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 57 (1999).
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violence, and the City's lawyers defended the law largely on the grounds of its
necessity-because of,not in spite of, its extreme breadth.77
By calling the law inconceivable, then, the Court must be making a
normative claim, not a descriptive one; what is inconceivable is that so broad a law
would be consistent with due process principles, not that a legislature might see fit
to enact it. And that is a perfectly sound conclusion. Indeed, I find the holding in
Morales unassailable. But let us be clear: the holding must claim strength,
ultimately, from the proposition that the Constitution places limits on statutory
breadth.
To summarize: a "void-for-breadth" rule is already operative, below the
surface, in existing law. It simply needs to be excavated and theorized-and molded
into a consistently applicable tool, rather than a makeshift one.
The "void-for-breadth" rule is strong medicine, of course, and it is so by
design. In practice, some of its uses-perhaps a great many-will end up
dismantling legal regimes (or parts of legal regimes) that serve important policy
goals. While we certainly should not celebrate this outcome, we also should not shy
away from it. The reason we need a "void-for-breadth" rule, ultimately, is the same
reason due-process values limit the ability of legislatures to enact broad laws in the
first place: because it is tempting. It solves a problem, often a very pressing one, and
if it happens to yield externalities-well, perhaps that is simply the cost of doing
business.
As an institutional ideal, due process stands against this kind of "good
enough" mentality. Due-process protections aim, explicitly and on purpose, to make
governance more difficult-to hold state officials to a higher standard, facing the
exigencies of everyday governance, than they might be inclined to embody
themselves. Put bluntly, it is easier to proscribe virtually everything than to write
narrow laws, especially when penalties are relatively minor and politically powerful
constituencies are unlikely to shoulder much, if any, of the practical enforcement

77.
On this front, the opinion below (from the Illinois Supreme Court) is
instructive. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 58-59 (Ill. 1997), aff'd, 527 U.S.
41 (1999) (describing the policy genesis of the ordinance, and indicating that it was broadly
drafted in part to ensure "discretion [for] police" working in gang units). As is the City's
merits brief before the Supreme Court. See Brief of Petitioner at 44, City of Chicago v.
Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1998) (No. 97-1121) ("[W]e do not contend that the ordinance could
never be applied to persons whose conduct may be in fact innocuous or inoffensive. But the
benefits from removing a visibly lawless element of loiterers from the public ways-because
loitering by gang members and those who join them destabilizes communities, facilitates
criminal activity and gang recruitment, intimidates law-abiding residents, lowers property
values, and places both gang members and those loitering with them at risk if rival gangs
come along-surely could reasonably be thought to justify whatever burden is imposed on
persons engaged in 'innocent' activity who are directed to move along as a result of this
ordinance."). Note the scare quotes.
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burden. Which is precisely why courts need to intervene-and why the right tool is
sometimes a sledgehammer, not a scalpel.78
Of course, for a tool to be effective, its use need not be frequent-and here,
as with the void-for-vagueness doctrine, the mere possibility that courts might
swoop in to counteract extreme breadth would likely go far, on its own, in
disciplining the legislative process.7 9 The point is not to invalidate a huge quantity
of laws, or to pursue full-blown micromanagement of the legislative process. The
point is to create an overall atmosphere of judicial supervision and corresponding
self-regulation by lawmakers.80 Accomplishing this, moreover, will not be a matter
of setting out exact criteria of overbreadth; in fact, some degree of "fog" may be
salutary, encouraging legislators to act precautionarily rather than toeing the line.8 '
The goal, at bottom, is to equip courts with a mechanism for saying, "no; not good

78.
I leave for another day whether, and in what sense, this logic also applies to
groups of laws-or entire portions of a criminal code. One could imagine arguing, for
example, that traffic regulations provoke breadth-based due-process concerns when
combined, even if no specific rule would be independently infirm. At bottom, the question
would be: can a legislature cure the problem associated with shotgun statutes-the

criminalization of everyday life" problem-by enacting discrete prohibitions that work, in
tandem, to the same effect? The intuition is no, but a full analysis of the question would likely
require an article (at minimum) unto itself, in part because the question of how courts should
approach groups of laws that, by interoperating function like a unified law, is undertheorized
across the board. For the beginnings of such an analysis in the context of vagueness
challenges, see, Carissa Byrne Hessick, Vagueness Principles,48 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1137, 114551(2016).
79.
See, e.g., Forde-Mazrui, supra note 63, at 1501-02 (describing the ways in
which the void-for-vagueness doctrine, as a background constraint on legislators and
enforcement officials, has changed behavior-and compiling sources). For more general
background on the salutary effects of judicial oversight, even when sparingly applied, see,

Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of Lawsuits in Law

Enforcement Decisionmaking,57 UCLA L. REv. 1023, 1086 (2010) (discussing the effect of
lawsuits as a deterrent on law enforcement actions and arguing that "more robust and effective
information policies and practices can increase the impact of lawsuits on law enforcement
behavior"); Brennan-Marquez, supra note 50, at 1295 ("[W]hen officials know they may have
to account for decisions later on, the decisions look different. Officials take greater care; they
think twice. In other words, the goal of [judicial review] is not simply to enable oversight. It
is also to make judicial supervision largely superfluous-by encouraging officials to take
account of constitutional and rule-of-law values in the process of decisionmaking. A perfect
system of oversight, after all, is one that never has to be mobilized, because its deterrent effect
is that strong.").
80.
See FOUCAULT, supra note 51, at 195-228 (describing Bentham's panopticon
as the perfect instrument of surveillance, because it does not even require surveillance to
occur-the threat of surveillance is enough).
81.
See Seanna Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the
Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARv. L. REv. 1214 (2010) (arguing that public officials
should be subject to some degree of uncertainty in constitutional rules, in order to induce
,moral deliberation"-the same argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to lawmakers).
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enough; due process requires more," while maintaining a conceptually stable
division between legislative and judicial power. 82
C. How Broad is Too Broad?
With that goal in mind-empowering judges to discipline the legislative
process by intervening at the extrema of statutory breadth-I want to close with a
few remarks about which kinds of breadth are most worrisome on due-process
grounds. In other words, how broad is "too broad"? Or better put, in what sense
might a statute be held, consistent with the due-process principles explored above,
too broad, and thus "void-for-breadth"?
These questions are of major practical importance, for without an answerstated or unstated, well-theorized or not-courts would have nowhere to begin. But
the questions are also of great conceptual importance, because, simply put, not all
breadth is troubling. Homicide statutes, for example, are often extraordinarily broad,
in the sense that: (1) they encapsulate, by design, many different means of
committing the underlying offense and (2) they flatten away significant gradation in
terms of underlying moral culpability. There is, however, a deep sense in which
these forms of breadth-in the context of something like homicide-are acceptable
insofar as anything that fits into the umbrella category has passed the threshold of
"meriting significant punitive action," even if the legal regime exhibits, as any legal
regime at some level must exhibit, greater coarseness than the underlying reality it
aims to regulate.
With that in mind, there are three ways that broad statutes can be troubling
on due-process grounds. All three involve porous criteria-but then, of course they
do. That is simply to say their application requires judgment. Fortunately, we have,
ready-at-hand, a class of public servants who have made judgment their craft.
First, broad statutes are troubling if they occasion highly disproportionate
results. If relatively minor wrongdoing can lead to draconian consequences, it
subverts the expectation, central to the rule of law, of a predictable link between
inputs and outputs. 83 For this to be true, moreover, perpetrators need not lack notice
entirely about the wrongness of the predicate act; in other words, the problem does
not hinge on the possibility that a reasonable person could reasonably have been
unaware that the underlying act carried some kind of legal penalty. The point, rather,
is about the severity of the penalty relative to the culpability of the crime. After all,
the premise of the Court's analysis in both Marinello and Yates was that anyone
82.

See Jane Bambauer & Toni Massaro, Outrageous and Irrational,100 MINN.

L. REv. 281, 283 (2015) (observing a similar pattern with the "outrageous government
conduct" and "rational basis" tests in constitutional law-though rarely used, they loom
large).

83.
See generally Kiel Brennan-Marquez, "FairNotice" in the Age of Big Data,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AI & ETHICS (Dubber & Pasquale eds., forthcoming 2020).
For a conceptual argument against this kind of result, see, Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy
Laws, 102 CALIF. L. REv. 655, 683-85 (2014). See also John S. Wiley, Jr., Not Guilty by
Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation, 85 VA. L. REv.
1021, 1023 (1999) (arguing-in a similar spirit to the proportionality claim-that minimally
or nonculpable violations should be excused on that ground alone).
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would have known-or at any rate, should have known-that purposely thwarting
the administration of taxes or getting rid of evidence was a criminal act ofsome sort.
But that did not stop the Court from recognizing the clear breadth issue. 84
Second, broad statutes are troubling insofar as they effect a "shotgun
approach" to social regulation-one that ends up, in effect, criminalizing large
swaths of everyday life. On this front, the key Supreme Court case is Morales, and
many lower-court opinions follow suit. The idea, at bottom, is that legislatures need
to try harder. Past a certain threshold, it becomes impermissible to pursue regulatory
goals-even legitimate ones-by criminalizing large swaths of normal activity.
Doing so turns virtually everyone into a criminal, at least on paper; and it leaves
ordinary people without a meaningful understanding, ex ante, of the legal risks our
actions invite. Hence the Morales Court's focus on the "Sammy Sosa" hypothetical:
the image of an apparent gang member and his father waiting outside Wrigley Field,
only to be commanded by law enforcement to disband, disturbed the plurality since,
in its words, a case like that demonstrates the "substantial amount of innocent
conduct" reached by the ordinance.85 This, however, is not quite right. The
hypothetical is not troubling because the imagined conduct is innocent-the
ordinance itself renders the conduct criminal-but because the conduct ought to be
innocent. In this sense, the "criminalizing everyday life" variant of breadth is, by
necessity, a species of substantive due process: a claim, at bottom, about the
unenumerated limits of how far state power may legitimately reach, consistent with
a system of constitutional democracy. And rightly so.
Third, broad statutes are troubling when they shade into other constitutional
rights. At some level, this risks hovers in the background of every case analyzed in
this Essay, as well as the overall argument-for the more broadly a statute reaches,
the more likely it is, ceteris paribus, that conduct falling under that statute's scope
will also involve the exercise of an independently enumerated right. Here, the Fourth
Circuit case discussed above, Lytle v. Doyle, is instructive. Although the court
analyzed the "no loitering on bridges" statute in terms of due process-and saw fit,
on that basis, to partially strike the statute down-it was also worried, indeed quite
explicitly, about the First Amendment implications of leaving the law intact. 86 Yet
the problem is not limited to statutes, like the one in Lytle, with an obvious
connection to protest or other political expression. It is potentially true of any law
that relates to the occupation and traversal of public space, insofar as that often
serves as a precondition (if not always an instance) of First Amendment activity.

84.
See, e.g., Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101, 1108 (2018) (explicitly
acknowledging that someone who pays a babysitter without withholdings "may... believe
that, in doing so, he is running the risk of having violated an IRS rule," but still would have
no way of intuiting that "he [could] fac[e] a potential felony prosecution for tax obstruction.").
85.
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 60-61 (1999).
86.
Lytle v. Doyle, 326 F.3d 463, 469 (4th Cir. 2003) (tethering the due-process
problem to the fact that, at the time of their arrest, "[t]he Lytles were exercising their First
Amendment right to speak out peacefully against a practice with which they disagreed").
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CONCLUSION
At a moment in history when bipartisanship has all but vanished from our
politics, overcriminalization remains a flashpoint for progressives, libertarians, and
small-government conservatives alike. 87 Breadth is one facet of overcriminalization.
But it is an especially important one, because it yields, in a manner less true of many
of overcriminalization's other facets, to doctrinal intervention-and what is more,
doctrinal intervention with roots in existing law.
No panacea is promised here, for the roots of overcriminalization burrow
deep. The hope is that, by using the tools of due process to intervene on the margins,
judges will not only do justice in particular cases but also counteract some of the
broader pathologies that plague law enforcement today. A lasting solution to
overcriminalization is going to require political will, and lots of it. That may not
arrive for some time. It may never arrive. But in the interim, we have courts, and we
have a Constitution-and while these tools can hardly be trusted to perfect our legal
world, they can still make headway on some of its more glaring blemishes.

87.
Compare Glenn Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When
Everything Is A Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REv. SIDEBAR 102 (2013), with Erik Luna, The
OvercriminalizationPhenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 703, 712 (2005).

